VERSAILLES TREATY AS DEAD FOR FRANCE AS U. S.

Declaration of Harding Administration Makes Radical Changes Abroad Most Probable and Before Reparations Problem Is Solved a 'Treaty of Berlin' May Be Needed to Whip Germany Into Line---All Clemenceau Gained at Paris Conference Practically Has Been Lost Since

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

WILL the Treaty of Versailles be revised by a conference held at Washington or by a treaty made at Berlin? This is the question squarely raised now, when the first declarations of the Harding Administration and the subsequent indication of French policy serve to reopen the whole discussion of European affairs.

Announcement on behalf of the State Department has been made that American representatives are to resume the place which was occupied by other representatives of this country in the reparations council. It is further intimated that on invitation we are prepared to send delegates to the Porto Roso conference, which, on April 30, is to take up nominally the question of helping Austria, but actually the problem of restoring economic life and order in Central Europe, from Prague to Salonica.

We have now to consider the whole range of American declarations in recent weeks, beginning with the note to Berlin which warned Germany of American purpose in the matter of reparations, followed by President Harding's message to Congress and completed by the statements coming directly from the State Department and expressing the purpose of the United States to resume participation in the economic discussions of Europe. In the same sequence must be counted the notes to Great Britain and France in the matter of mandates.

What the United States Wants As Defined by Administration

Now the American conception, the conception of Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes, seems fairly plainly set forth. America has rights which must be asserted, hence the mandate discussions. America has a duty which must be performed, hence the warning communicated to Germany through Mr. Dresel at Berlin. Finally, America has interests, economic interests, which are vitally affected by European conditions and discussions, hence the assertion that we desire to be represented in all economic conferences, such as those held in the past at Spa, San Remo, Hythe, London and Paris.

As a matter of foreign policy we have rejected the League of Nations and foreshadowed a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, so far as we are concerned, which draws the blue pencil through all but those clauses immediately affecting our rights and interests. We have declared for the speedy passage of the Knox resolution which ends a technical state of war with Germany, and we have thus envisaged the resumption of economic, and probably of diplomatic, relations with Germany.

But to arrive at any revision of the Treaty of Versailles even affecting our own interests we are bound to face some form of international conference. We may send a mission to Europe. We may, before sending it, prepare the bases for discussion by a series of notes, such as Mr. Hughes has begun to utter. But in the end we must either go to Europe or ask Europe to come here. And it is to the latter possibility that Washington plainly turns with favor.

Yet, granting that Europe, our Allies of the war, are quite prepared to hear with interest our views and yield to certain of our claims which affect questions of right, such as Yap, such as the whole mandate issue, such as the cable controversy, is it by any means certain that Europe will welcome any proposal which carries with it the revision of the Treaty of Versailles in any fundamental detail, or will listen resignedly to any arguments made by American representatives which aim at modifying the sum total of German reparations or of softening the measures taken to enforce German payment?

We shall have to be very frank with ourselves in facing the European reaction to our course in the matter of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. We have undertaken to eliminate everything in the treaty which is not of positive advantage to ourselves. Starting with this as a basis, we have envisaged a policy which would be expressed in participation in international discussions, in which further reductions of the advantages gained by others in the treaty might be advocated and might even be championed by ourselves in our own interest.

Where Payment of Reparations Clashes With Our Policies

To put the thing bluntly, Mr. Hughes in all his public documents has laid especial stress upon the capacity of Germany to pay, raising very clearly the point that there is a fixed limit existing in his own mind and recognized by American policy to German capacity, and that at some time and place American representatives will express their views on this subject. But how can they while we insist upon collecting our loans to Europe without regard to the capacity of the debtor nations to pay?

This was the difficulty at Paris, which ultimately reduced our financial representatives to silence. Mr. Baruch sets it forth in his volume, which is worth rereading at this time. We can say to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, "reduce your claims for German reparations, they are excessive," but in saying this we cannot once more affirm, as was done at a recent Cabinet meeting, that our loans to Europe will not be cancelled or reduced.

The thing which is not accurately appreciated in America is that the allied demands upon Germany represent in fact—far more than 50 per cent.—the basis of allied payment of American loans. The Germans owe to the British, under the Paris agreement, almost exactly the sum which the British owe us. When France has deducted from her share of German reparations the portion due to Britain and the United States she will have less than enough to pay for restorations and nothing for pensions.

Must Agree to Reduction Or Remain Silent on Subject

Thus it follows inevitably, as the experience of the Paris conference demonstrated, that at a certain point American representatives must abandon all agitation for a reduction of German reparations or accompany their arguments with promises that America will agree to reductions of its claims. The United States cannot argue that its associates of the war show greater consideration for Germany than it is willing to show to these same associates. Yet there is much talk now of "fixing reparations," as if they had not been fixed, or the past fixation could be simply modified.

It seems to me that to assume that, because the United States is manifestly affected by economic unrest in Europe and because this unrest is due in part to the question of reparations, we have the right or could acquire the privilege to procure a reduction of the sum total of German reparations is to imagine a vain thing.

What the Harding Administration has yet to learn is that for every concession to its own interests, it must expect to pay in concessions to European interests. This was the final lesson of the Paris conference.

It may be assumed as axiomatic that the French, the Belgians and the Italians (and probably the British) will not consent to any reduction at their expense of German reparations merely because such a reduction by restoring European markets would benefit the United States. If we are going to set up such claims we can only maintain them by entering into a new transaction. And it was transactions, after all, which ruined Mr. Wilson at Paris.

Mr. Hughes has said over and over again in public utterances, and his documents have indicated the same view, that the United States is intimately concerned with every phase of the world economic situation. It is a favorite phrase, borrowed from official sources, that every American consumer and taxpayer is affected by the European situation. But it is not realized with sufficient clarity that to obtain a benefit for the same taxpayers and consumers we shall have to pay in kind.

Moreover, and this point is capital, since we have decided to reject all of the Treaty of Versailles which is not of benefit to us, is it unreasonable to expect that a similar policy may presently be adopted by one or more European Powers? This brings me to the alternative I have mentioned in my opening paragraph. If the Treaty of Versailles is mainly rejected by the United States, why should it not be rejected by France? Certainly the objections are no more than technical and the way of escape not fraught with too many legal difficulties.

Let us suppose, for example, that France should find in the present German attitude in a final refusal on May 1 to meet the conditions explicitly laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, warrant for action against Germany which might amount in terms to a declaration of war. Let us suppose that France sees in that method an escape from a situation which is fully as unsatisfactory for her as that created by Mr. Wilson has been for us. Let us conceive that France should repudiate the work of Clemenceau as we have "scrapped" that of Wilson.

Certainly there is quite as much justification for the French. They resigned permanent occupation of the Rhine barrier in return for Anglo-American guarantee against German attack, unprovoked attack. But the American Senate has not, and will not, ratify that treaty and the British ratification is valueless without the American. France has then lost security in advance. In the same way France resigned her historic and economic claims to the Sarre Basin in the face of Anglo-American opposition and with the assurance of Anglo-American financial and political assistance as a substitute. And neither the one nor the other is forthcoming.

France Has Lost Its All And Must Act on Its Own

France has in reality lost everything which Clemenceau bargained for in the Conference of Paris. She is now thrown back upon her own resources to collect any reparation. She has been compelled already to reduce her reparations claims, first in the original Conference of Paris and thereafter in the various conferences from Spa to London. Aside from possession of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, temporary ownership of Sarre coal mines under League of Nations direction and limited occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, she has nothing to show for her victory.

Why, then, should not the French, following the American example, free themselves from the Treaty of Versailles? They can do it by the simple recourse to a declaration of war for which German actions have supplied, and will continue to supply a score of reasons. Following the declaration they can go to Berlin. There is no one to stop them. At Berlin they can write a new treaty of peace which insures them permanent occupation of the Rhine barrier and absolute title to the Sarre Basin, which will give to their Polish ally the equally clear title to Danzig and to the Silesian coal fields. And at Berlin they can make final terms covering the whole subject of reparations.

I am aware that such a programme will seem to some of my readers fantastic and to others criminal. But, stripped of all details, it represents a very fair repetition of the American course. We found the Versailles bargain totally unsatisfactory and we repudiated it. We were able to repudiate before ratification, while the French Legislature ratified it on the express assumption that American ratification would follow promptly and automatically. The French have been caught where we escaped, but do they need to stay caught? Is there no way out for a nation, wholly united in sentiment and possessing the power to express its national purpose?

In my judgment such a French course will be made almost inevitable if the American decision to reenter European discussions with the express purpose to avoid all commitments and work solely for the protection of American economic interests is followed to its logical end. If the United States undertakes to set up a right to fix the sum of German reparations while insisting upon maintaining the sum of allied indebtedness to it, that claim will not only be repulsed but repulsed with extreme bitterness.

Europe wants American cooperation: one hears this assertion on all lips, and the truth is self evident. But Europe does not understand American cooperation to be unilateral. France understands cooperation to mean assistance in collecting German reparations, not undertaking to reduce the sum total of those reparations. All our former associates can understand a policy which seeks to reassert American rights that have been allowed to lapse by American passivity in past months, but which can be revived. So far the Harding Administration is on sound ground.

Europe can also recognize, if it understands a little less easily, the decision to have nothing to do with the League of Nations; that, too, is a matter of right. But the moment America undertakes to resume a place in European councils, then it is just as plain as plain can be that along with participation goes payment. If American business suffers from European unrest, if American interests will be benefited by a restoration of real peace, then let America pay her share toward such a result. This is the situation which American representatives will have to face.

Clemenceau in Bad Odor With Most of His Countrymen

The events of the months which have followed the Paris conference have had a French, as well as an American, reaction. The repudiation of Clemenceau is just as big a fact as the repudiation of Wilson. And Clemenceau has been repudiated because he based his whole conduct of the peace negotiations upon the conception of Anglo-French-American solidarity. The American people are accustomed to refer to concessions made by Mr. Wilson, which they regard as prejudicial to American interests, with bitterness, but there is no less bitterness in the tone of a Frenchman talking of the concessions Clemenceau made to Mr. Wilson and Lloyd George.

The Treaty of Versailles counts in France for just as colossal a failure as in the United States and, in addition, it is reckoned a national catastrophe, since it has prejudiced so many French vital interests, which count for far more than the rather shadowy values represented in Yap or Mesopotamian oil. If the mass Americans desire to escape from the control of the unpopular paragraphs of the Treaty of Versailles, what shall one say of the feelings of the average Frenchman whose very existence to his mind is compromised by the document?

In my judgment, then, it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that one consequence of the positive declarations of the Harding Administration of foreign policy may be the "scrapping" of the Treaty of Versailles by the French. I do not think that there can be much debate over the assertion in French lips that France ratified the treaty under a total misapprehension. She was promised certain benefits and she paid in advance. But the benefits have been withheld and cannot now be obtained under any conditions.

The way out, as I have said, is plain. The road to Berlin is open, and a treaty of Berlin can easily cure the defects of the document made at Paris and signed in Versailles. The United States has repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, Germany has deliberately defied its provisions. The benefits France claimed and believed to be assured are lost. Why should France "stick" when the United States has "quit" on far less impressive reasons?

Business Bound to Suffer If France Goes to Berlin

Of course if France goes to Berlin American business will suffer. So will British. There will be criticism in London and in Washington. But will either Britain or the United States undertake to secure for France the things which every Frenchman holds essential, as essential as the United States has held those rights, to preserve which it has repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, in all the essential details? Will either the American or British Government consent to share with France the expense of a joint military and naval operation to bring Germany to terms? Will the United States guarantee to France any of the things which France believes she can obtain by action now?

What has happened is that just as in the United States the Wilsonian doctrine of world association under the League of Nations has been repudiated, in France, the Clemenceau doctrine of Anglo-French-American association has been abandoned as a phantom not a reality. We are asserting here in Washington over and over again each day a policy which we describe as American. But every returning traveller from Paris can testify that in the French capital one hears just as frequent iteration of a policy which is there named French.

The course of the Harding Administration in repudiating the League of Nations and all but American circumstances of the Treaty of Versailles, which amounts in reality to abandoning the treaty, whatever the disguise of language employed, must supply the French with precisely that warrant in fact which they desire for a similar policy based upon even greater material considerations. If the American believes the Treaty of Versailles did violence to American independence, the Frenchman is not less firmly convinced that the same treaty created a permanent menace to French safety, that it left France at once financially ruined and militarily indefensible.

Now, exactly this state of mind and state of facts will have to be faced by Mr. Harding, by Mr. Hughes, by whatever distinguished statesmen it may send to Europe to represent the United States in any new or old international commission. America is to go, so official Washington asserts, to protect and advance American interests. But these interests have no peculiarly sacred character. They must take their place alongside British, French, Italian and Belgian interests. When there is a conflict there will have to be a compromise. When we maintain our interests we shall have to pay for it.

Allies Having Failed to Deliver. France May Make a "Treaty of Berlin"

At Paris in 1919 France desired to fortify her future by taking certain precautions. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson persuaded her to abandon her purposes, but only by promising something specific in return, something "equally good." But both have failed to "deliver" and France from her point of view has regained her freedom of action. She is undertaking in 1921 to seek the same things she was deprived of in 1919. She has the power and she believes she has the right. She is strengthened in her conviction by the course of the United States in repudiating a transaction which it held injurious to national interest. What will Great Britain and the United States offer now, if anything? And if they offer nothing, why should France hesitate?

One danger in the whole situation lies in the wholly exaggerated notion Americans have of their own power in the situation. Washington believes America has only to ask to receive. Mr. Wilson believed the same thing, but discovered at Paris that it was a case of "pay as you enter" and at each fare zone thereafter. We have far less power now than then, but otherwise the situation remains the same. We can obtain a reduction of the total of German reparations, but only by making a similar reduction in the total of American loans. We can persuade the French to relax military preparations against German attack, but only by guaranteeing American aid. What we cannot do is to persuade any Englishman, Frenchman, Belgian, Italian or Pole to give up something vital to him solely because the sacrifice might benefit us.

In the last analysis the action of the Harding Administration has done something more than kill the League of Nations—it has slain the Treaty of Versailles. In rejecting the document because of purely American reasons it has supplied the basis for similar rejections in Europe. Our participation was one of the fundamental circumstances. In removing our post we have undermined the whole structure. France ratified it only because of the guarantees of our support which it contained. They are gone.

The treaty is dead for France. The business of French statesmanship now is to obtain something in its place. As long as there was a doubt of American decision France had to wait. But there is no doubt and there is no further reason to wait.

That is why I believe that before the year is out we shall have a treaty of Berlin supplanting that of Versailles. For in the last analysis, if Mr. Harding's decision has rescued us from all foreign entanglements it has just as completely released France from all foreign restraints. If Mr. Harding has replaced Mr. Wilson, M. Poincaré has just as completely replaced M. Clemenceau, whether he operates through M. Briand or in his own name. In a word, the Treaty of Versailles is dead.

Ancient Marvels of the Sea in Miniature

Model of Ship That Cost Charles I. His Head Ranks as Gem of Exhibition and Cost $25,000

By FRANK L. CURTIS.

VISITORS to the Architectural League exhibition, now being held in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, stand in wonder and admiration before a glass case in which is the model of a fine old seventeenth century ship of the line, the Sovereign of the Seas. Few of them, perhaps, know that it was this ship that cost King Charles of England his crown and his head.

The same rivalry for the greatest navy in the world that is going on to-day was the taxpayers' burden of 300 years ago. Charles I. built the Sovereign of the Seas in 1637 in reply to Louis XIII.'s great ship La Courone, but the British King neglected the formality of calling Parliament to authorize the expenditure. The Sovereign of the Seas, then the most formidable war vessel afloat, was to have cost £18,000. When completed her cost was £41,000, an unheard of sum in those days. It was the last straw that broke the back of the long suffering British public.

The model, however, holds additional claim to interest. It is the most elaborate ship model ever built in this country. Twenty men worked on it for three years, and it cost approximately $25,000. To the tiniest detail it is made exactly to scale, ¼ inch to a foot, after the original plans of Phineas Pett, designer and builder of the first Sovereign of the Seas.

Collecting of Ship Models One of the Day's Latest Fads

The question arises naturally, Why should so much labor and money be spent on the construction of a "toy ship"? The answer is simple. Collecting ship models, old and new, is the latest fad. The Ship Model Society, scarcely a year old, recently opened its first public exhibition in the Fine Arts Building, in West Fifty-seventh street, which is now going on.

Among the members of the society, all ardent ship model "fans," are Newcomb Carleton, James A. Farrell, H. H. Rogers, Sherman Hoyt, Junius Spencer Morgan, Irving R. Wiles, Arthur Curtiss James, Henry W. Kent, Carleton T. Chapman, W. L. Aylward, Harrison Cady, Clifford H. Ashley, Breckinridge Long, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Allan Forbes, Booth Tarkington, H. O. Havemeyer, Jr., and George F. Baker, Jr. Mr. Wiles, a well known portrait painter, is president of the society.

Fifteen years ago ship model collecting was unknown in this country. Pioneer collectors picked up some of their most valuable prizes in junk shops and waterfront saloons for $5 and $10. These same models, in good condition and their authenticity proved, now bring as much as $4,000 each. Dealers are importing models from abroad and find a ready market here.

The germ of ship model collecting may be said to have had its origin in an article which appeared in the *Century Magazine* for August, 1911, written by Dana Carroll. It was entitled "Little Ships: an Account of Model Collecting." Since that time the number of men who have taken up the hobby has steadily increased. The society was organized by Henry B. Culver about a year ago. Mr. Culver is a model expert and has superintended the building of some of the best models made in the United States, including the Sovereign of the Seas.

The most interesting models are the "prisoner of war" variety, so called because they were carved out of bone by French sailors in British prisons. Prior to the Napoleonic wars ivory carving was one of the chief industries of Dieppe. Many of these ivory workers were drafted into the French navy and fell into the hands of the British. It is said that they saved the bones from their food and clubbed together to buy materials to make the delicate little ships now so highly prized by collectors.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries British and French ships were built directly from models, many of which are now preserved in national museums. The finest collection in the world is in the Musee de Marine in the Louvre at Paris. Here Admiral Paris of the French navy brought together all the old dockyard models. The same thing was done in England by order of William IV.

It is a source of regret to American model collectors that most of the original models of the famous old Yankee clipper ships have been destroyed. Donald McKay of Boston, most famous designer and builder of clippers in the forties and fifties, left his collection of ship models to a niece. Unfortunately this woman had no eye for the artistic, and one cold winter the models were broken up for use as firewood.

Among those she destroyed were those of the Flying Cloud, Lightning, another Sovereign of the Seas, Nightingale, Great Republic, &c. Were these models in existence to-day they would be invaluable. The Lightning, fastest ship that ever sailed, was built by McKay for a British company. On her maiden trip, February 18, 1854, she sailed from Boston to Liverpool in 13 days 19½ hours. March 1 on that trip she established a record never equalled by sailing vessels and seldom surpassed by the fastest steamships of to-day. Her skipper said he had crossed the ocean on the rim of a cyclone. The log for March 1 is historical:

"Wind south. Strong gales. Bore away for the North Channel. Carried away the foretopsail and lost jib. Hove the log several times and found the ship going through the water at 18 to 18½ knots. Lee rail under water and rigging slack. Distance in 24 hours, 436 miles."

In a recent address on American sailing ships Theodore F. Humphrey, who has one of the finest American collections of ships' models, described these wonderful old clippers:

"All sail was often carried when ordinary ships were seen reefed down on the same course. As Clark Russell notes in one of his novels, the skipper of the ship from Europe, as he paced the deck with anxious eyes upon his shortened canvas, fearing that it would be blown from the bolt ropes, very often saw a tiny speck upon the horizon, watched it grow into a splendid ship with 'every rag set,' saw her fling the Stars and Stripes to the gale as she went roaring by and then, with feelings that cannot be described, gazed after her until she disappeared in the mists."

And again another author:

"A British vessel, snugged down to reefed topsails and holding bare steerageway in the South Pacific or Indian Ocean, would see a cloud of snow white canvas burst out of the gloom and vanish like a ghost to leeward—a Yankee clipper under royals."

Only Thirty Steamers as Fast Sixty Years After the Record

At the outbreak of the world war, after sixty years, there were fewer than thirty steamships in regular trade throughout the world that could equal the speed of the Lightning. In 1905 in the race for the Kaiser's cup the schooner Atlantic, Capt. Charlie Barr commanding, made the run from Sandy Hook to The Lizard in 12 days and 4 hours; but her best day's run was only 341 miles.

The speed of the Lightning on the day she made her record of 436 miles was the equivalent of nearly 510 land miles at the rate of 21½ miles an hour. There were no steamships in those days that approached this record by as much as 100 miles. It was not until twenty-five years had passed that the Arizona made 18 knots on her trial trip.

When the records of the Yankee clippers are recalled and the fact that at one time America was forcing England into a secondary position on the sea by building better ships and manning them with better navigators and crews, it seems wrong that the relics of our maritime glory have not been more carefully preserved.

It is the purpose of the Ship Model Society to establish a nautical museum with models, books and records of our navy and merchant fleets. Two or three members of the New York Yacht Club some years ago endeavored to start a marine museum in New York, but without avail. The new society, with the keen interest its members take in their hobby, promises better results this time.

Henry B. Culver's $25,000 model of the Sovereign of the Seas on exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Charles I. of England built the original in 1637.



American Collectors Aim to Perpetuate Traditions of Famous Clippers and Other Yankee Triumphs

Mr. Goslington on Likes and Dislikes

THERE are men that we dislike at sight; they have a streak of meanness or brutality or something that we recognize instinctively; the best we can do with them is to treat them with civility. But there are not many such; the vast majority of men have good in them and are entitled to be treated as brother men.

I have no patience with the speakers I hear talking about protecting the rights of our humblest fellow citizens. There are no humble fellow citizens; no man feels humble in his heart and every man resents being described or being considered as humble. Happily, we hear less of this humble business than we once did.

I feel that I have much yet to learn; but I long since discovered that a man likes to be treated like a man. He resents any air of superiority or patronage or condescension from anybody. Poor though he may be and lacking in what is called an education, he may yet have in full measure the cardinal virtues of self-respect and decency; he may truly be as good as anybody. And long ago I began to discover in men high and low qualities most unlooked for.

You never can tell what any man has in his heart. The street sweeper is as likely to dream dreams as the banker. The poor man may be by nature as refined as the rich man; and barring the few men instinctively brutal, who may be high or who may be low, all men are entitled to be met as men and to be treated with courtesy; not merely with kindnes, but with courtesy, which all men are pleased to receive and the lack of which all men resent.

Of this we may be sure, that as we go through life we get what we give.